Introduction
International efforts to stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations will ultimately rest on two interacting pillars of climate policy: (1) the architecture and stringency of international agreements to reduce emissions and (2) climate friendly technology development and the speed of its diffusion. Of these two pillars, emissions policy has proven the most prominent in international climate dialogues. Technology has been addressed in climate dialogues through a variety of mechanisms addressing both development and diffusion, but it remains more of an undercurrent in these discussions in comparison to the more explicit and prominent discussions over emissions reductions. Yet, technology is a means of achieving emissions reductions, and the development of cheaper and more effective technologies will be critical for reducing costs and increasing the social and political viability of substantial greenhouse gas emissions reductions over time. Hence, it is important to understand the interactions between these two elements of international climate policy.
Researchers using long-term, global, energy-economy-climate models have predominantly explored international climate policy and technology development and deployment issues individually. Research on the implications of incomplete international participation in emissions reductions (e.g., Edmonds et al., 2008; Richels, et al., 2007; and Keppo and Rao, 2006) has illuminated the implications for total cost, the viability of achieving various longterm stabilization levels, and the cost and emissions implications for specific individual regions. A separate line of research has demonstrated that advanced technologies, both today and in the future, can dramatically reduce the costs of stabilization, and this research has explored the relative benefits and characteristics of various portfolios of technology developments (e.g., Clarke, et al. 2007a , Edmonds, et al. 2007 , GTSP, 2000 . This research has built on broader discussions on the role of technology in addressing climate change (Pacala and Socolow 2004, Hoffert et al. 2002) . However, research on the interactions between international emissions agreements and technology development and diffusion using long-term, global, energy-economy-climate models has been limited. Richels, et al., 2007 was first to address these issues in tandem. The authors considered firstbest and second-best policies structures under two sets of technology assumptions that differed in that one set placed limits on the deployment of nuclear power and carbon capture and storage technology (CCS). In this paper, we build on the work of Richels, et al., 2007 , using a broader set of technology variations in the MiniCAM integrated assessment model , Clarke, et al., 2007a , to further unpack the interactions between international emissions policy and technology development and diffusion.
Several key themes emerge from the analysis. First, we find that technology is even more important to reducing the costs of emissions mitigation when international policy structures deviate from immediate and full participation. Given that international policy architectures will deviate from first-best, and that the degree of action taken by individual countries will depend on the costs of action, this result further emphasizes the need for technology development to be a foundation for domestic and international climate strategy.
Second, this paper emphasizes that international diffusion of climate technology may be as or more important to domestic mitigation cost containment as domestic technology diffusion. International diffusion can reduce the domestic mitigation burden associated with a long-term climate goal by allowing greater emissions reductions internationally.
Third, we observe that near-term carbon prices are inexorably tied to the expected long-term character and availability of technology. Thus, near-term carbon prices reflect in a very direct way expectations about technology a half century and more into the future.
Fourth, we compare the influences of policy architecture, namely the impact of international policy architectures that control the concentration of CO 2 to be 500 ppm in the year 2095 and find that the impact of delayed participation by some regions requires that participating regions compensate with greater emissions mitigation. More importantly we find that the policy architecture has a relatively modest effect on global emissions limitation pathway when compared with the impact of technology availability.
Fifth, we observe that while differences in regional emissions pathways are more sensitive to international policy architecture, technology availability remains a strong force shaping emissions regardless of the international policy architecture. Further, we find that more rapid technology improvements reduce the relative influence of the policy architecture.
Finally, we consider the implications combining CCS technology with bioenergy production, namely electricity production with negative carbon emissions. This technology creates the potential for human society to move the atmospheric CO 2 concentration arbitrarily down and not simply up. Strong market forces could emerge that direct bioenergy away from use as a liquid fuel toward use to simultaneously capture carbon and produce electricity. The consideration of negative emissions raises troubling questions about the long term, namely at what concentration of greenhouse gases and at what global mean surface temperature should humankind choose to maintain the atmosphere? We make no attempt to answer this question here leaving it as an exercise for the reader.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the approach to the analysis and provides background on important issues that influence this approach. It provides an overview of the MiniCAM model, develops four possible technology development scenarios, develops two alternative international policy architectures-one with full participation by all regions from 2012 onward and another with delayed and incomplete participation, and establishes an environmental goal of limiting the concentration of atmospheric CO 2 to 500 ppm in the year 2095. Section 3 discusses the relationship between technology, international policy architecture, and global emissions mitigation over time. Section 4 discusses the implications of technology and policy architecture in greater detail emphasizing the regional character of the interactions. Section 5 examines the influences of international policy architecture and technology availability on the magnitude and distribution of the benefits to improved technology availability. Section 6 provides a summary and closing thoughts.
Approach
We employ the MiniCAM integrated assessment model in conjunction with alternative sets of technology evolution pathways and alternative hypothetical international policy architectures aimed at limiting the concentration of atmospheric CO 2 to 500 ppm in the year 2095.
MiniCAM
The analysis in this paper was conducted using the MiniCAM integrated assessment model. MiniCAM (Brenkert et al. 2003 ) combines a technologically detailed global energy-economy-agricultural-land-use model with a suite of coupled gas-cycle, climate, and ice-melt models, integrated in the Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse-Gas Induced Climate Change (MAGICC).
The MiniCAM is a direct descendent of a model developed by Edmonds and Reilly (1985) . MiniCAM was developed and is maintained at the Joint Global Change Research Institute, a partnership between the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and the University of Maryland, while MAGICC was developed and is maintained at the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR). MiniCAM is a global model disaggregated into 14 geopolitical regions. It is solved on a 15-year time step. MiniCAM does not attempt to address international trade in goods and services other than energy and agriculture and even there does not attempt to assess bilateral trade issues.
MiniCAM has been used extensively for energy, climate, and other environmental analyses conducted for organizations that include the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and other government, private and non-governmental organizations. The MiniCAM is designed to examine long-term, large-scale changes in global and regional energy systems, focusing on the impact of energy technologies. Documentation for MiniCAM can be found at http://www.globalchange.umd.edu/models/MiniCAM.pdf/.
The scenarios in this paper were conducted using the version of MiniCAM that participated in the U.S. Climate Change Science Program's (CCSP) scenarios of greenhouse gas emissions and concentrations (Clarke, et al. 2007a) . Extensive documentation of the assumptions for the models can be found in that document as well as in Clarke, et al. (2007b) . An important feature of the MiniCAM is that energy, agriculture, forestry, and land markets are integrated with the extent of unmanaged ecosystems and the terrestrial carbon cycle. The MiniCAM thus produces outputs that include not only emissions of 15 greenhouse gases and aerosols but also agricultural prices, land use, and stocks of terrestrial carbon.
To explore the topics outlined above we begin with a reference scenario. To simplify the analysis and to provide a well documented point of departure we employ the socioeconomic foundations documented in Clarke et al. (2007b) .
Technology Suites
On that foundation we build four alternative technology development pathways, Table 1 . Each of the four technology development pathways is defined by developments in eight different technology domains. For the purposes of this analysis we do not prescribe how each of these suites is brought into being. We are agnostic as to whether technology advances, relative to our reference technology suite (REF) , represent the fruits of intensive and potentially expensive research campaigns or a serendipitous process of scientific discovery. If it is the former, then all associated costs would have to be added to the direct emissions mitigation costs that we compute to obtain the total cost of achieving an emissions mitigation outcome. In this exercise, however, we make no attempt to associate research investments with particular technology outcomes.
It is well known that non-emitting energy technologies such as wind power, solar power, nuclear power, and geothermal power can reduce emissions by enabling the production of electricity without concomitant carbon emissions. Energy efficiency improvements reduce emissions by facilitating the provision of energy services with fewer energy resources. CO 2 capture and storage is similar. The ability to capture and store carbon for long periods of time in geologic formations facilitates the continued use of fossil fuels in large point source applications with minimal carbon emissions to the atmosphere. The potential role of hydrogen is more complex. See Edmonds, et al. (2007) .
Still more complex is bioenergy, which produces a hydrocarbon fuel where the carbon was obtained from the atmosphere. With regard to direct emissions, it can be considered a zero emissions fuel. Recently questions have been raised by a variety of authors including Searchinger et al. (2008) and Crutzen, et al. (2008) about the indirect effect of bioenergy production on deforestation rates, crop prices and non-CO 2 greenhouse gas emissions. Indirect emissions are addressed in the MiniCAM, which includes agriculture, land use, land cover, and terrestrial carbon stocks and flows 1 . Note that in this analysis, that all anthropogenic carbon emission, be they from fossil fuel and industrial sources or land-use change, are treated equally. That is, the price of carbon (discussed below) that is employed to limit atmospheric CO 2 concentrations to 500 ppm in 2095 is applied equally to all emissions sources. Thus, in all of the policy regimes considered in this analysis, afforestation programs are an important component of the technology response. Since energy sector technology is the focus of this paper, we leave for future papers to discuss the potential roles of non-energy technologies.
When bioenergy is available it can be utilized to produce a liquid fuel that can be used in the transportation sector. A great deal of research has focused on the development of liquid fuels derived from bioenergy feedstocks for use in the transport sector. However, bioenergy could also be used to generate electric power. When both CO 2 capture and storage and bioenergy are available technology options they can be applied in combination to provide electric power with negative emissions. That is, since the biofuel derived it carbon from the atmosphere, the application of CO 2 capture and storage technology to the fuel use in power generation 2 has the net effect of producing electricity while removing the captured CO 2 from the atmosphere.
Hypothetical International Policy Architectures
In this paper we focus our attention on a single potential policy goal, namely limiting the concentration of atmospheric CO 2 to 500 ppm in the year 2095. As none of the technology suites considered in this paper alone result in an atmospheric concentration that is 500 ppm or less in the year 2095, we further assume that emissions are limited so as to achieve that outcome.
The concentration of CO 2 in the atmosphere in the year 2095 depends on cumulative emissions of carbon from all sources, including fossil fuel, industrial and land-use change emissions over the entire century. The introduction of anthropogenic carbon emissions from terrestrial and industrial systems into the atmosphere results in an increase in fastcycling carbon, and therefore implies a permanent, at least for the next 1000 years, increase in stocks in the atmosphere and ocean systems, though the disposition of those stocks between atmosphere and ocean carbon reservoirs evolves over all time scales. Thus, climate change is a very long-term, global problem.
In an ideal world limiting atmospheric CO 2 concentrations in the year 2095 would be a straight forward matter of placing a price on all carbon emissions, from all sources, everywhere, and raising the price at a rate that minimized the cost to the Earth's economies of achieving that goal. While such an eventuality cannot be assessed as likely, it provides a reference benchmark against which to compare other, less perfect developments in international policy architectures.
We examine a second potential international policy architecture in which emissions mitigation is undertaken beginning in the year 2012 by nations included in Annex I to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC; United Nations, 1992) as well as South Korea, but for which other regions begin limiting carbon emissions at later dates. The dates for which emissions limitations are first applied for each of the MiniCAM's 14 regions is given in Table 2 .
Stabilization of CO 2 concentrations implies a rising price of carbon. We assume that the Annex I plus South Korea group and other regions as they join share a common price of carbon applied to all emissions from all sources. Since the coalition price is doubling approximately every 15 years, new members of the coalition would experience an economic carbon-price shock if the carbon price instantaneously went from zero to the then current price in the mitigating coalition. We therefore assume that the initial price of carbon in a region that begins emissions mitigation after the year 2012 is below the price shared by the more senior members of the emissions mitigating regions to prevent economic shock to economies joining the hypothetical international architecture after it has gotten underway. (The initial price assigned to a new entrant is assumed to be based on the relative GDP per capital relative to the USA in the year 2000.) The price of carbon in regions undertaking emissions limitations later in the century gradually rises to that of the Annex I regions. In this analysis we will compare the interactions between technology availability and participation in our hypothetical international policy architecture for limiting atmospheric CO 2 concentrations. We will refer to the idealized case as the full participation international policy architecture or simply FULL. When we examine the hypothetical protocol with varying dates of initial emissions mitigation given in Table 2 , we will refer to that case as DELAY.
In this paper we start with a "no climate policy" scenario without limits placed on carbon emissions based on the MiniCAM scenario with our REF technology suite as well as eight other combinations of hypothetical international climate policy architecture and technology suites, Table 3 . By comparing and contrasting cases we can observe the relative influences of international participation and technology in shaping the future development of the global energy system and the cost of meeting our hypothetical atmospheric CO 2 limit in 2095.
3 Limiting CO 2 Concentrations: Technology, International Policy Architecture, and "Overshoot"
Emissions along the "no climate policy" scenario grow to more than 20 PgC/y by the year 2095.
The Implications of limiting CO 2 Concentrations under Full International Participation
Limiting the concentration of CO 2 to 500 ppm in 2095 is accomplished by imposing an exponentially rising price on carbon in all regions and all emitting activities in the scenario with FULL participation of all nations from the outset. The price paths for the four technology suites are shown in gy availability a half century or more into the future, or any ther of the variables that define our scenarios, near-term actions depend on expectations nown technologies". However, the economic cost of a tion, even in the highly idealized Not surprisingly, the price path to limit the atmospheric CO 2 concentration to 500 ppm in 2095 is highest for the REF technology suite, lowest for the ADV technology suite with costs for the other two technology suites falling between.
We note here the importance of c 2 emissions over the entire century, the long-term future and present are tightly coupled and cannot be uncoupled. The assumption of intertemporal cost-effectiveness leads to a simple intertemporal price pathway with each period's price directly linked to the previous period's price by the rate of interest. Near-term prices depend as much on expected technology availability in the long-term as on near-term technology availability. While it is impossible to anticipate technolo o about the long term in a way that is unlike other environmental issues such as acid deposition or local air quality with which society has dealt in the past.
The REF technology suite might be thought of as "known technologies" in that they do not deploy CO 2 capture and storage or any new nuclear power plants. Other technologies are assumed to evolve, but no breakthroughs occur. We would therefore conclude it is feasible to limit atmospheric CO 2 concentrations to 500 ppm in 2095 with "k chieving that stabiliza Similarly, the price paths for the RNE and ices between the REF factor of six, $1200 per ton C in the former case and $400 per ton C in the latter instance.
will discuss this point in more depth in Section 5. We therefore agree with Pacala spheric CO 2 concentrations can be (2002) , that the development of advanced energy technologi of the enterprise. Advanced energy technologies provide the means by which costs of stabilization can be managed.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the emissions and concentration paths leading to the 500 ppm CO oncentration in 2095. Important differences are foun c The availability of CO 2 capture and storage along with advances in the productivity of bioenergy crops, relative to the REF technology assumptions leads higher near-term emissions and CO 2 concentrations, and lower long term emissions with both the ADV and the BIO/CCS technology suites. This is not merely an artifact of the advanced technology availability. The emissions and concentration pathways for both the REF and RNE technology suites are quite similar, hile the price paths for the two diverge. w BIO/CCS technology suites are similar, while emissions and concentration pathways differ markedly. The ability to generate electric power with negative emissions exerts a powerful force on the emissions pathway.
We also find that when CCS is available bioenergy is predominantly deployed in conjunction with electric power generation. As the carbon price rises less and less is transformed into liquid fuels that can be used in the transport sector. This is important, because it is often assumed that bioenergy will ultimately be used to fuel transport. However, strong market forces could develop that would work to shift bioenergy into power generation. Such arket forces could emerge if CCS is available and the net negative emissions of the m bioenergy/CCS technology combination were appropriately rewarded. 
The Implications of "Overshoot" Pathways
Emissions pathways such as those exhibited in for the BIO/CCS and ADV technology suites are referred to as "overshoot" trajectories. During some portion of the time between the initial date and the date on w tration limitation is satisfied, the co ost concentration limitation scenarios are constructed so that the final period atmospheric CO concentration limitation is nev xample the scenarios developed in Cl s are limited such tions fall is, by nstruction, an "overshoot" trajectory) to the limit and is maintained at that higher level in ntual goal. They create the potential for oncentrations to be arbitrarily greater than the long-term limit for some fraction of the time been achievable. For some concentration limits, overshoot pathways may be e only option for meeting relatively low climate limits. They allow the globe to achieve ge scale n employing these crops in the production of electricity with CCS to achieve negative In a "not to exceed" (NTE) framing of a concentration limit emission that the concentration rises (any scenario in which concentra er exceeded. See for e co perpetuity thereafter. In a sense any NTE scenario is a commitment to achieve and maintain a prescribed atmospheric CO 2 concentration.
The potential impacts and role of overshoot pathways can be perceived in two ways. On the one hand, overshoot pathways are troubling because they exhibit concentrations that exceed, at least for some period of time, the concentration that is sought at a particular date. They are therefore associated with potentially greater environmental damage during the period in which concentrations are above the eve c preceding the limitation target. In a practical sense, the intentional creation of an overshoot pathway leaves open the possibility that once exceeded, the necessarily relatively steeper declines in annual emissions later in the century may never materialize.
Overshoot pathways create the potential for greater variation in emissions and concentration pathways than is possible with an NTE formulation and greater variation in climate change. Though, it must be remembered that even with an NTE formulation variation in emissions, concentrations and climate change exist as discussed in Wigley, Richels, and Edmonds (1996) The availability of technology capable of deliv the potential for human society to move the atmospheric CO 2 concentration arbitrarily down and not simply up. The consideration of negative emissions and overshoot pathways thus raises still more troubling questions about the long term, namely at what concentration should humankind choose to maintain the atmosphere? We make no att question here and leave for future research a deeper exploration of the implications of overshoot pathways.
The Implications of Delayed Participation in the International Concentration Limitation Coalition
The previous sections discussed the role of technology in an idealized international regime limiting the concentration of atmospheric CO 2 to 500 ppm. In this section we compare these results from the idealized control regime with our hypothetical international control gime with delayed participation. We make two key observations:
, but is also strongly affected by technology availability.
gy regimes is significantly larger than the cross time depend on available technology. hat is, the ability to sharply reduce emission in the BIO/CCS technology suited implies ion.
re
• First, the impact of delay on the global emissions limitation pathway is modest compared with the impact of technology availability, and • Second, the impact of delay on the regional emissions limitation pathway is more substantial than at the global scale While the global emissions pathway associated with a given technology regime is relatively less sensitive to the international policy environment than to technology availability, the same is not true at the regional scale. These dramatic differences are muted by the availability of the ADV technology suite. Note that when the ADV technology suite is available Indian emissions are reduced relative to the "no climate policy" reference scenario. The enhanced performance of end-use energy technologies and renewable and nuclear energy technologies associated with the ADV chnology suite mean that Indian emissions dec te difference between the FULL participation and DELAY participation international policy architectures is lessened when the ADV technology suite is deployed. (Part of the reason that the price of carbon is lower in the presence of the ADV technology suite is the fact that even without a price on carbon, end-use energy technologies and renewable and nuclear energy technologies reduce emissions because these non-emitting technologies are more competitive.)
Of course, with either the REF or the ADV technology suite available emissions mitigation international protocol than under the FULL participation international protocol. This influenced by the • Second, in the near term both global and regional energy systems are anchored in re differences between these cenarios and the reference scenario. By 2095 freely emitting fossil fuels ave virtually disappeared in both ond this commonality, the energy s
The necessary stringency of global emissions mitigation associated with limiting atmospheric O 2 concentrations to 500 ppm in 2095 mand gy system adopt he addition of the option of nuclear power in the RNE technology scenario along with enhanced renewable energy and energy efficiency options leads to a more balanced follows from our earlier observation that for a given technology suite there is relatively little ability to shift emissions mitigation over time. Thus, participating regions are forced to make up emissions mitigation not forthcoming from non-mitigating regions. But, the availability of the ADV technology suite does substantially mute the shift in burden.
The Composition of Technology Deployment in the Near Term and Long Term
The composition of global and regional technology systems are both international policy architecture and by the nature of technology availability. We make the following observations that reinforce conclusions reached in Section 3.
• First, by the end of the century the nature of both global and regional energy systems are shaped by the character of available technology options for delivering energy services with minimal carbon emissions. And, while the policy architecture flavors technology deployment in these two regions, available technology dominates the character of regional technology deployment.
existing technology and infrastructure and therefo systems are modest.
However, as technology evolves, it lays down new vintages of capital and infrastructure. Thus, in the near term it is not clear which technology suite will eventually dominate. This suggests a line of future research to investigate the nature of R&D investments that might be expected to manage technology uncertainty. ates that the global ener C technologies that minimize emissions. The nature of technological advance defines the costeffective options that are available globally, and is responsible for the relative importance of different technologies in broad terms.
The REF technology scenario relies more on energy use reductions and renewable power, particularly wind power, than the other scenarios because nuclear, dedicated energy crops, and CCS are not available. The inclusion of CCS and dedicated bioenergy crops in the BIO/CCS and ADV technology suites leads to dramatic CCS deployments, including dramatic deployments of coupled ioenergy and CCS in power generation. The assumed improvements in bioenergy and CCS chnologies in the BIO/CCS technology suite, coupled with limited improvements in enduse energy efficiency makes the BIO/CCS a largely energy supply oriented emissions m ith advanced versions of all technologies available in the ADV, the composition is roughly main a part of the energy system in 2095 in China and he long-term deployments of coupled bioenergy and CS are higher in late century with incomplete international participation for these same he long-term composition of the energy system is uncertain and dependent on the ailability, cost, and performance of future technology and on emissions mitigation b te itigation scenario W more balances, although still dependent to a large degree on coupled BIO/CCS because of its negative emissions potential. Scenarios with CCS and dedicated energy crops still include the use of freely emitting fossil fuels at the end of the century with the associated emissions balanced by the negative emissions from BIO/CCS. Improved versions of end-use energy technologies in the ADV technology suited lead to less reliance on supply side energy technologies and a more balanced technology portfolio in 2095 in both China and the USA.
The Influence of Policy Architecture on the Long-term Composition of Technology
International participation also influences the long-term composition of the energy system through several avenues, which can be seen in Figure 4 .1 and Figure 4 .2. Delay increases long-term carbon prices, leading to greater long-term deployments of low or negative emissions technologies across all of the technology suites.
A second avenue along which delay affects technology is through any continued differences in participation that may persist through the end of the century. Those countries participating in mitigation will see still higher carbon prices than those not participating (Africa in 2095) or those participating at lower relative carbon prices (India and Latin America in 2095).
A final avenue is earlier investments in low emissions technologies for those countries taking earlier action. The influence of differing arrangements for international participation can be seen across the scenarios. For example, in the technology suites without CCS (the REF and RNE technology suites), fossil fuels re India only under full participation. T C reasons.
That t av architectures provides a strategic context for decisions today. How should decision-makers respond to the uncertainty and what near-term actions should they take? These are the questions that decision-makers face today.
Technology in the Near Term
will be the most effective long-term options. In addition to mitigation ngroduction. Fossil
All pathways to stabilization include a gradual movement to the final composition of the energy system. Given the uncertainty in the long-term character of the energy system, the goals of near-term, technology-related actions are (1) to begin to reduce emissions, (2) to make investments that will maximize the number of long-term options for mitigation, (3) to scertain which a actions, the focus of the near-term is on preparation for the dramatic transformations of the energy system that will appear in the long-term.
he length of this near-term period will depend on a range of factors, including the lo T term climate goal. The more stringent this goal, the more quickly large transformational changes must begin to take place and the less time for preparation. Figure 4 .4 show the energy systems in 2035 in the USA and China in the reference scenario and the eight mitigation scenarios. The contrast to the long-term energy systems is stark. Whereas the long-term energy compositions varied dramatically between cenarios, the near-term compositions vary primarily in terms of total p s fuels dominate in all the scenarios regardless of the technology suite that ultimately becomes available and the deployments of low or negative emissions technologies are small relative to the total size of the energy system. for Near-term R&D e die has not re at energy orders are beginning to be laid, and nd their clude itutions under which more dramatic emissions T e in
Implications
The near term is the time in which existing emissions limitation regimes are strengthened and initial emissions limitations are undertaken in other regions. However, th been fully cast by 2035 in these scenarios. There is flexibility to undertake a range of futu energy system evolutions beyond 2035. Capital stocks, infrastructure and institutions th existed in 2005 continue to exert an influence on the shape of global and regional systems. However, the foundations of new technology changes at investment margins increasingly reflect the nature of technology options a evolving character. Under more stringent targets, or without architectures that in overshoot, the die must be cast earlier.
In addition to a time in which the inst mitigation will be organized, the near-term is also a time for technology experimentation and exploration. While this paper will not examine the nature of an R&D strategy to manage technological uncertainty, laying down scientific foundations for a broad range of future technology development, creating more human capital resources that could be applied to technology development, and exploring a wide range of potential technology development avenues would seem likely results of a more formal treatment.
Technology and the Cost of Emissions Mitigation
A range of studies have demonstrated that technology is critical for lowering the costs of nt SA t not long-term climate goal, but also because their le.
levels of action, regardless of whether the hange olicy and given the importance of questions regarding the role er the costt in less idealized future , Cost, and Policy Architecture deal. Figure 5 .1 shows the s olicy architectures. The value of technology can be ith om the addressing climate change. Indeed, technology was identified as perhaps the most importa driver of differences in mitigation costs in the mitigation scenarios generated by the U Climate Change Science Program (Clarke, et al., 2007a) . Mitigation costs are importan just for their impacts on welfare for any given influence on the long-term goals that might be considered socially and politically feasib The degree of action that countries take to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions is largely a function of the perceived costs associated with calculus is conducted qualitatively or with rigorous cost-benefit analysis.
The majority of studies considering the cost implications of technology for climate c have considered idealized scenarios of international cooperation. Given that real p regimes will deviate from this ideal, of technology policy in the climate policy portfolio, it is natural to ask wheth reducing effects of technology will be more or less importan international policy architectures with delayed or partial participation.
Technology
We find that, in this set of scenarios, the economic implications of improved technology are greater when policy regimes are less than i discounted global policy costs over the century across four alternative technology suite under FULL and DELAY international p measured as the difference between the costs with reference technology and the costs w more advanced technology suites. In these scenarios, the global cost reduction fr advanced technology under a regime of delayed participation approaches twice magnitude of the global cost reduction when international participation is complete and immediate. In other words, technology development and deployment is an even more important component of the climate policy portfolio if the markets for climate mitigation are not fully formed. The distribution of mitigation costs among regions has an important influence on the degree and distribution of action. Although this analysis sheds light on total costs, it is impossible to determine the ultimate financial effects for any country participating in an international mitigation regime, even within the rarefied environment of an integrated assessment model, without consideration of the allocation of burdens across regions. The precise mechanisms that are used internationally, from CDM to technology deployment incentives to full carbon trading, will determine the final burdens carried by individual countries and regions. This analysis is silent on these distributional issues, noting only the global costs.
1 8 B The Public Goods Aspect of Technology
At the same time that analyses have shown that technology will have important global implications for costs, the vast majority of technology research and development activities are conducted at the national or regional level. There is a public goods character to the development and diffusion of climate change technology, because of the public goods nature of global stock pollutants such as greenhouse gases and also because of the public goods nature of knowledge. There are two mechanisms, a direct effect and an indirect effect, by which domestic R&D activities can alter mitigation costs for the nation conducting them. The direct effect is to reduce the costs of meeting any national mitigation goal, irrespective of international efforts. The indirect effect -the emissions burden effect -is to reduce the national emissions reduction burden associated with meeting any long-term target by allowing for greater reductions internationally. If technology makes mitigation cheaper internationally, it will lesson the national mitigation requirement to meet any long-term climate goal.
The relationship between the direct and indirect effects is important because many national climate-related research and development activities are supported by analyses of the direct effect. This approach to analysis tends to downplay the impacts of international technology deployment and diffusion -the public goods character of technology combined with the public goods nature of climate change more generally -in justifying domestic research and development activities.
To explore this issue, we have conducted an experiment in which we have applied the advanced technology assumptions only in the USA and only outside of the USA. This experiment has been conducted under the assumption of full global participation, and we have considered only the reference technology and advanced technology suites. The comparison between the cost reductions in these two cases illustrates, if without consideration of burdens, the relative impacts of USA versus international technology deployment. Not surprisingly, if advanced technology is available everywhere but the USA, the total global costs of abatement are smaller than if advanced technology is only available in the USA, Figure 5 .2. Although the USA has historically been among the largest greenhouse gas emitters, it does not represent the majority of emissions, and the USA share of emissions will decrease as developing countries take on larger shares in the future. Hence, deployment outside of the USA allows advanced technologies to be applied to more greenhouse gas emissions than deployment in the USA, reducing global costs.
The USA results provide more direct insight into the domestic impacts of domestic and international deployment (Figure 5 .3). When technology is deployed only in the USA, the costs to the USA, under first-best participation, lead to increased mitigation costs in the USA With greater opportunities to mitigate, the USA is called on to do more than other countries. The indirect effect-the emissions burden effect-is larger than the direct effect. In contrast, when technology is deployed only outside of the USA, the costs are dramatically lower for the USA, even though there has been no change in USA technology. To meet a particular environmental goal-in this case 500 ppmv by the end of the century-there are greater options for mitigation outside of the USA, leading to a lower USA emissions reduction requirement. The caveat to the results of this experiment is that it is impossible to determine the ultimate financial effects for any country participating in an international mitigation regime, as discussed above, without consideration of the allocation of burdens across regions. The results shown in Figure 5 .2 and Figure 5 .3 were developed assuming a global carbon tax or a cap-and-trade regime in which the emissions quantities are perfectly allocated to match firstbest so that there will be no trading. In reality, the costs of mitigation in any region will not be the same as its mitigation costs. Permit allocations, wealth transfers, and other financial flows associated with mechanisms such as emissions trading or CDM can shift the economic burden across regions.
This caveat notwithstanding, the experiment makes a strong case for the public goods nature of technology in addressing climate change. If countries were to choose targets independently without consideration of the international environment, then international diffusion and the associated indirect effect of technology development -the emissions burden effect -is not relevant to domestic R&D consideration. On the other hand, to the degree that countries such as the USA are looking toward a long-term environmental goal and are interacting internationally to meet that goal, there is strong evidence that the international diffusion of technology is a larger factor for domestic costs than domestic deployment. This argues strongly for a domestic incentive to induce international climate technology deployment, and it also argues strongly for consideration of international deployment as part of domestic analyses of climate change technology benefits. Simply put, the international benefits of climate change R&D can be as or more important than the domestic deployment impacts.
5 B Concluding Thoughts
This paper explored the interactions of international policy architecture and technology availability on the limitation of atmospheric CO 2 concentrations to 500 ppm in the year 2095.
